The Iron Age 1945-01-04: Vol 155 Iss 1

President and Vice-President General Editorial and Advertising Offices Johnson, Reader Market Research 4 Hayes, New ‘New York Angeles 2420 Ave. Offices ond Séth Sts. AND DIRECTORS MUSSELMAN, HILDRETH TERHUNE Vice-President SAUR BARBER, Treasurer JOHN BLAIR the Industrial Arts Pub- North America, and Address, Vol. 155, No. January 1945 Ninetieth Annual Review Issue Editorial Private vs. Public Technical Articles 121 152 152 152 158 158 Tin Prices.............. 160 Scrap, Grade and District 164 Features Personals and Obituaries News and Markets Iron and Steel Scrap News and Prices.................. 194 Comparison Prices Week and 197 Machine Tool Market Developments................... 198 293 IRON AGE | A The Gear Housing, pictured typical the character work that goes through the Mahon plant each day. The annealing furnace, the background, but one item equipment essential the fabrica- tion plate work volume. THE HANDLE ANY JOB! great has become the demand for Welded steel plate diversified the parts and fittings fabricated—only those plants with long and varied experience —and with the essential skill and equipment—can qualify successfully meeting today’s requirements. Mahon occupies foremost position this highly specialized field. Flame cutters, saws, power brakes, auto- matic welding machines, positioners, annealing furnaces, sand blasting equipment, X-ray testing apparatus, etc.—all necessary the handling, shaping and fabricating large production steel plate work—are the hands experienced operators. addition, our DESIGN ENGINEERING SERVICE your complete disposal helping you determine whether your product adaptable welded steel plate construction—and, so, assisting you re-designing it, when ; | | and General Manager: ANTHONY Pittsburgh Chicago Otis Bidg. DONALD BROWNE BUGENE HARDY Washington Press Bidg. LLOYD 1016 Guardian Bidg. 7310 Woodward Ave. MURDOCK Correspondents ROBERT DEAN Buffalo Boston HUGH SHARP Angeles JOHN McCUNE EDMONDS Private vs. Public Employment you are “able and willing work,” the postwar world there should job waiting for you, according the thinking our modern political economists. There are provisos, however, that are never mentioned because they would not politically popular. These are: “Provided the work you are capable doing fills need; provided the pay you receive for commensurate with the service rendered, and provided some employer creates the necessary employment. There are just two kinds employers whom you can look for work, private and public. has been promised that private employ- ers cannot make jobs for everybody, then the public employer, namely Uncle Sam, will. Private employers America have had the most experience creat- ing and employment, having previous the war provided per cent all available jobs, good times and bad. Private em- ployers pay better wages all along the line for work they want done than does the public employer spite the fact that they have self- liquidating their operations whereas the government creates employ- ment liquidating the taxpayers. Private employers have manufactured employment jobs profit. Government almost invariably does loss. Even during the 10-year pre-war period, 1930-40, public debt increased per cent while private debt was reduced 25.5 per cent the same period. Private employers have not only created more and better employ- ment than has the government and made while reducing its burden debt, but they have better served the public while doing mea- sured prices charged for goods and services. For during the same 10-year period they reduced the cost goods purchased wage earners and low salaried workers per cent* while government increased the cost its services the public 74.9 per cent. When government undertakes create employment, not having make ends meet meet competition, its tendency create putting two men one man’s work put men work unneces- sary jobs. That easy way make jobs, but hard the tax- payers. reminds the story the two chaps who invented stove polish and soap that was the only solvent that would remove the stain the polish from the customers’ hands. One partner made the rounds selling the polish and the other followed him two days later sell- ing the soap. made two jobs out one, but was hard the cus- tomers. government wants has take hand creating postwar em- ployment, the best way can slip couple aces the form tax and regulation relief into the private employer’s deck and then sit back and watch him town. the philosopher put it: “Let them does knows how.” When comes creating jobs, Uncle Sam good kibitzer but second-rate money player. Abstract the United States, 1942, Table 399, page 377. ° pie 4 ‘ { | 4-Way Traction matter what foot wheel contacts Inland 4-Way Floor Plate, projection edges which safely grip, forward, backward, left, right—4-Way Safety Traction. The special Inland 4-Way pattern permits sweeping and drainage whatever direction-is most convenient, clean floors contribute safe- and Inland 4-Way Floor Plate makes easier. Strength Inland Floor Plate made high quality open steel. has the tensile, compression and bend strength structural steel plates. Its wear resisting qualities are far greater than other floor 4-Way Matching The Inland pattern the same all four direc- tions. Plates can matched end end, side side, side end, provide continuous and appearance. Pieces, even small ones, can matched and used with practically waste. : = q A=\ News Front Loss Germany Nikopol, the Balkans and Hungary has reduced its 1943 supply 350,000 tons contained manganese maximum yearly rate approximately Being cut off from the Petsamo nickel mines has left Germany with yearly output 1000 tons, principally from Norway, equivalent little more than per Germany's 1943 supply. Germany's sources molybdenum have been ‘eliminated. These are been bombed. the United States, primary aluminum production reached about 750,000 net this year while secondary aluminum ingot produced from scrap amounted 300,000 tons. The secondary aluminum ingot makers can look market running high 000 tons year when manpower problems are solved. Determining factor will price. But with high grade bauxite stocks dwindling, thus tending raise costs metal production, and with less rigid specifications for many civilian the secondary aluminum industry bids fair win wider attention and benefit nation through conservation resources the same time. Widespread use gas turbines for power will the inevitable result the pressure for higher railroad speeds and more economical operations. One actually getting experimental results with direct drive steam turbine. Little immediate premium seen for use lightweight materials new designs. Present car speeds are adequate for existing roads. When better Broads are available, light metals may brought into the picture particularly the Freight car demand make the wartime backlog will approximately 70,000 annually for five years and about 55,000 cars thereafter handle 1929 volume business. This estimate assumes that the roads will per cent utilization. for locomotives, estimated necessary replacement would call locomotives per postwar year until the war lag made up, after which normal requirement about 1050 units year would have made handle volume business. Many foundries are turning mechanized because the severe manpower shortage. These start the yard when pig iron, scrap, sand and other raw materials mare handled the melting, and cleaning departments the shipping reduce manpower minimum entirely eliminate the hard physical labor associated with charging operations complete mechanical charging systems been designed. Steel production this year reached record 89,500,000 net tons that probably not equalled for some time. Finished steel production reached tons. Changing battlefronts Europe has increase ammunition steel from about 300,000 tons November, 1944, extended program 560,000 tons month March, 1945. Cause for the comeback steel companies seeking price relief from the Office Price Administration has been, addition the wage rise granted, the cutback during the middle 1944 profitable war items. Steel mill facilities will crowded capacity during the early 1945. estimate 16,519,000 tons carbon and alloy steel for the fourth quarter expected hold good for the first two quarters 1945. Public anticipation sharp drop war production when Germany defeated estimate steel requirements for the first and second quarters 1945 prepared short time ago listing demand two-war and basis war demand drop the one-war estimate only one million tons carbon and 500,000 alloy steel. 4 : | | | | | a,” 1944-1945 War has preémpted the spotlight from alluring postwar visions the Elysian fields. Meanwhile, amid frustrated recriminations and the gray maze economics and politics, the casting about for harsh blacks and whites goes with about the usual resolution. HAT first year war had its emotional stimulus unprec- edented industrial challenge. The second year rode along the wave demonstrable achievement. The third year—1944—was the so- called industrial “close-out” year, the year world-wide military exploits and welter postwar statistical castles home paced softening production indexes. But the 1944 “close-out” year re- fused close out. The two great tyrannies with understandable fury refused die. And, all the statis- ticians home transposed their late 1944 ordinates over into mid-1945, the war became sodden affair blood rather than neatly extrapo- lated curve reconversion chart. Industry 1944, mirrored its advertisements, shifted from boldly colored “Zowie-look-how-my-products- are-winning-the-war” theme pastel pictures inventive mechanization astride the blooded steed competi- tive free enterprise, straining the post off succor American womanhood from all toil general and irritating war hardships par- future, the electronic kitchen the jet-propelled housemobile carried safe- along the bosom radar, auto- matically timed, and requiring only casual drop vitamin-fortified oil between trips the psychiatrist. This theme, with its four-color- bleed nuances, was stimulated the bold cubism economists, both repu- table and pseudo. There deadly cashable war bonds, unequalled bank deposits, and currency circulation soaring above the fantastic $25,- 000,000,000 mark, all juxtaposition with three-year liquidation con- sumer goods. this monetary dis- tortion has been erected the apex ever-expanding priori economic pyramid, with so-many cashed bonds supporting so-much purchasing, which produces so-much national income, which creates so-many jobs, which returns so-much taxes, which services and refunds so-much debt, releasing so-much purchasing power, which, etc. Without base there can trun- cation the pyramid. But, the pic- ture persistently brings mind the awe the Frenchman who, see- ing the splendiferously magnificent uniform Lord High Admiral, re- marked, “Mon Dieu, quelle responsa- bilité!” While this 1944 emotional escapism from war the moment dis- favor proportionally with the German military resurgence, its popularity rested broad base general in- difference regards desirable but su- perimposed social and economic war aims (the only real war aim, fre- quently lost sight of, conquer conquered). Coupled with this in- difference was unpopular misin- terpreted intelligence the Ger- mans’ war potential, genuine concern all quarters (and also the concern self-interest) regards the social and economic imperativeness rapid reconversion, obvious necessity for cushions against demobilization shecks, and intense journalistic pres- sure along with actual and potential Congressional strictures leveled military over-planning. War- first civilians won out WPB upheaval only the narrowest margins, and even such “elder statesman” Baruch emphasized the critical urgen- immediate and widespread ac- tivation reconversion plans, even though 1918 had said that na- tion should plan war were indefinitely. This latter sen- timent, always private conviction WPB’s Krug, has just been publicized current policy. But the new industrial war commit- ments impose technical produc- tion burdens the metals industry Lippert comparable those 1943. They merely delay the period general in- dustrial reconversion and assure that shortages certain civilian items for the first time may actually, rather than emotionally, approximate the “total war” scarcities typical all the other warring nations. The dulling the German purch and the first good Allied war news will find postwar reconversion topics again full flower and the many factors involved unaltered. The finan- cial and political trends shadowy period industrial readjust- ment, with their counterpoint Federal and business bureaucracies and encroachments the state the internal and international economic domain, will weave the fabric indus- trial health. just what degree the future economy will based both governmental planning and free en- terprise depends the interplay variables still state flux, but past events are any criteria the com- ing pattern will evolve from make- shift compromise. However, the paradoxes this unfolding pattern are well worth quick scrutiny. Just about everybody has got his lick compounding postwar panaceas—conservative business asso- ciations, individuals, Ivy-League econ- omists, CIO, and the President with his work-budget 60,000,000 post- war jobs. It’s all relatively safe enough. Nobody holds grudge against the maker rosy estimate, and fact, few people will remember what the estimate was. Only the memory lingers that so-and-so was person stimulating imagination, who had painstakingly accumulated deal data and was intensely inter- ested industrial and economic progress, and had formulated some very lucid ideas about the postwar situation. setting their target for to- morrow the bulk prognosticators THE IRON AGE, January 1945—49 3 a | rp.) had hit V+2, 1947, the year postwar “normalcy.” Brookings In- stitute has set national income for that year $127 billion; Harvard’s Slichter likes figure around $130 billion; M.’s Sloan hits $125 bil- lion; Ruml and the agree $140 billion; Federal Reserve hits $170 billion; the State Department toys with $150 billion; and miscellaneous spokesmen came with anything from $100 billion $200 billion. Since most liberals believe that income $130 billion will required support prewar employment well accommodating the increase population and the very modest in- crease man-hour productivity, the other estimates contemplate future varying from sub-standard way life down-right riotous existence. There some evidence that all the postwar projections are “secondary” agreement gross figures would indicate. Most are incorporating their estimate different hidden devaluation the real value the dollar. Ruml and per cent depreciation, which brings their $140 billion estimate theoretically close accord with Sloan’s undepreciated The practical aspect, however, that Ruml’s dollar depreciates, does This factor dollar depreciation the flaw the pyramid. Some de- preciation has already occurred, and many man, and out industry, sympathy with the theory that only through modest dollar deprecia- tion can the higher entrenched ma- terial and labor costs sustained, and logical method devised for ser- vicing the debt. this issue somewhat questionable character seems least one point agreement between government and portion industry. Debtors psycho- logically for inflation, and would only natural that the sentiment should increasingly flourish Wash- ington thus ease the Treasury’s problem debt repayment through partial repudiation, not “dollars” but terms real purchasing power. Inflation, even the modest kird, pretty much economic pablum, how- ever. The high dollar value repre- sentative net increase real goods production and the findings graphed Figs. and rapidly lose significance. The remarkable corre- lation between national income and steel ingot production, Fig. would irdicate that the industry better stir its stumps and rapidly build new facilities, credence given the postwar dollar projections repu- table spokesmen, the basis depreciation. Contrariwise, depre- also the ultimate failure point for all the postwar projections. Further- more, study past peak load ac- cumulations for steel (Table page 52) has ingrained certain degree caution among steel producers. Further, depreciation pre-supposes that American business anticipates selling relatively high-priced products generally deflated world. This turn conjures the question how business proposes trade competi- tively and reciprocally all the glo- bal market places glowingly publi- cized various manifestos, and closely integrated most plans for exceeding prewar employment figures. set all these figures proper framework, the Presi- dent’s plan for 60,000,000 jobs can compared all-time peak 56,- 000,000 men and women employed July, 1944. Income projections can set against the following past per- formances: National National Income, Production Billions (Value Dollars Product) 1941 44.3 65.3 2nd _ half 1941 52.6 64.3 1942 55.3 €9.3 1942 66.2 82.8 1943 70.8 89.7 2nd half ..... 1943 96.8 1944 97.1 1944 81.5 99.9 Other paradoxes involved the war income triangle that the war bonds are merely legal claims against future wealth and income. And while all very comfortable easily jump this hurdle mumbling “refinancing,” way alters A’s giving money taxes pay B’s bonds interest. This sets the stage for much future political wrangling who pays what percentage how much tax. The postwar budgets will cut into middle-class budgets for some $200 $300 yearly taxes (See Fig. 2), against $50 the prewar period. This will new peacetime experience for Americans and perhaps portends less participation Income average durable goods wage earner > 1939 1940 1941 Goods and available: for consumption 1942 1943 smooth out many publicized wage peak. The bulk war workers, with dependents, war bond purchases, and income tax has not rolled quite the wealth feature writers critically portray. Even so, available goods and services 1943 were short supply compared with spendable income create the dangerous so-called inflationary gap shown here. 50—THE IRON AGE, January 1945 consumer goods markets and more acute interest future governmental policies. very burdensome super-structure debt has historically been beckon- ing highway inflation and thus systematic expropriation the mid- dle-class. terror they then en- courage the slow but steady perver- sion democratic and humane insti- tutions which leads ultimately form managed economy under the aegis one succession politi- cal opportunists. This trend, which American industry claims frightened of, could have been mini- mized industry’s forceful support very high tax structures during the war, straight across the board, which would have served the dual purpose absorbing the so-called inflationary gap and holding the debt digestible Marked apathy for such self- discipline mirrored the whole coun- try’s soft attitude toward the war and this particular opportunity for basic correction beyond recapture. n ) OOY Bonds Prewar enthusiasts for heavy construction steel ca- pacity based their esti- mates the remark- tween national income and ingot production. postwar estimates income are creditable, new capacity imper- ative. Or, perhaps that time more dollars will buy less steel! ~ nN income, billions dollars ~ ~ 100 o ingot production, millions short tons Raw materials, labor and technology will each have their crucial role play the future industrial economy, and the trends established year ago these factors are even more pro- nounced today. For raw materials the stage ing set for industrial economy forced more slender underground reserves leaner anal- yses. fixed custom credit solely the American system free enterprise the high standard living this country, but discredit this driving motive appreciate that nowhere else the world has there been found such ready juxta- position rich iron ore and coking coal, such wide distribution bountiful reserves copper, zinc, high grade bauxite, and the many other metallic elements that are invigor- ating technological society. This the last war that will fought with the rich red Lake Superior hema- tites, and the irresistible drift bene- ficiation that region over the next years has its corollary higher unit costs. High grade copper re- sources are petering out and high grade bauxite about finished. Only coal the outlook gratifying. This dilution basic wealth does not mean that such materials must necessarily imported, but the tech- nical improvising characteristic elsewhere the world must soon be- come part this country’s indus- trial framework. Technology clever indeed wheedling materials from thin and reluctant ores, but the penal- paid always higher translated into man-hour costs. All this naturally encouraging appreciation the philosophy im- National Income Steel Ingot Calendar year portation foreign metals trade some way complement dwindling home reserves least retard the teriffic rate attrition. There cer- tainly considerable merit the sug- gestion that such accumulation raw materials (as also the disposal war surpluses machinery and goods) offers means cashing some the country’s lend-lease credits, purchasing power the remainder the world support coveted export trade finished prod- ucts. The building stockpiles re- sulting from this policy (Mr. Wal- lace’s ever normal granary carried out metal) means strategic safe- guarding would naturally carried out under the aegis government agencies and therefore leads into cer- tain cartel and international political protocols characteristically buttressed price stabilizations and production controls. This inevitably formalizes pattern that apparently fright- ening American business groups, which see further evolution the cartel system this country lead- ing inexorably greater governmen- tal power with resultant additional regimentation the nation’s business and industry. Just how these irrecon- cilables will reconciled, and just what form and degree purpose direction will finally develop only the future will disclose. regards labor there con- tradicting fairly general and sizable continuation mark-up pay rates. This just another one the many straws pointing the direction high cost economy with second- ary implication dollar depreciation. Workers are basing their demands Dept. Commerce Conference Sloan Jr. and Brookings Institute billion dollars must 110 subtracted from these estimates allow for in- 100 creased personal tax level over pre-war standard.) @ o National income, billions dollars ingot production, millions short tons uo o Production Forecasted post war normal equity rises living costs (par- tially true), plus equity increased profits the part management (also partially true), plus the desire sustain postwar national economy and service the public debt (which inverse reasoning), plus increase man-hour productivity (questionable, irrespective the implication mid-year production statement issued Ford). There little real evidence sup- port the contention that worker pro- ductivity during the war has increased nearly the rate glorified publicity handouts. Those slight certain instances are pretty well offset easy and corrupt practices other directions, and careless inefficiencies traceable labor and smugly serene management. individual pro- ductivity that found the key what the future holds. Everything will depend the rapidity with which the volume real wealth produced the average American the aver- age hour. this can greatly in- creased—and certainly great deal remains done—it possible that future high wage and raw material cost structures can partially offset. During the war management has breaking down exceed- ingly complicated jobs into small and simple units which can handled efficiently hastily trained and sub-standard workers. Irrespec- tive possible long range psycho- logical reactions such instances over-simplification work, would seem inevitable that postwar industry will cling this technique even when the more efficient labor pool back from the battlefields. Such over-sim- plification work may well result THE IRON AGE, January 120 per esi- ° ° y ” l even more touchy management-labor relationships, what with its complete mechanization workers who have pride skill sense visible contribution the final effort. Nor has war prosperity been widely and evenly distributed among potential postwar consumers generally publicized. Or, least averages lead this conclusion. Some spot sampling workers has shown the individual war bond holdings the neighborhood $250, which hard- the basis for liberating sup- pressed buying spree. Average weekly earnings the ma- chinery industry was $51.95 per man July 1944; engine and turbine workers averaged $58.84; machine tool workers took home $56.90 weekly; shipyard workers averaged $62.90; iron and steel workers $50; and the automobile industry paid $57.02 (in January 1939 was $31.55). For all manufacturing industries the average weekly take 1944 was $50 (against $27.04 1935). When these pay checks are adjusted against past dol- lar devaluation and when tax loads are subtracted, the current prosperity translatable into future buying encumbered certain ambiguities and qualifications. critical influence postwar buy- ing psychology will the smoothness absorption displaced war work- ers and returning veterans. Appar- ently it’s going mad scramble understandable self-interest. The depressing fear even short-lived un- employment during reconversion will certainly influence many potential cus- tomers hoard what purchasing power they have accumulated. Passenger the integration the re- turning veterans into the industrial machine that will set uneasy stage for sensitive postwar decisions. unions and management have far frequently been over-solicitous with the first freshet veterans with resultant ‘moral damage the individual. When the freshet full flood, however, unions and management may become equally guilty exploiting the bellig- erency, uncertainty, and fear re- turning veterans secure short-lived advantages the struggle for power. Sensitivity all these variables has led widespread conclusion that Government will involved the maintenance employment, partic- ularly during the complex and erratic shadow phase. industry this looks like the 1930’s all over again. Con- fident postwar boom tax pro- ductive capacity, industry spokesmen have gone all-out assuming re- sponsibility for full employment exchange for freedom action for private enterprise. Here again the demands for free- dom are hedged certain ambigui- ties. Industry’s contention well taken that the heavy tax load risk undertakings eased, and this likely occur. But, the certainty heavy postwar tax loads precludes attainment full freedom action. And, while there evident pres- sure for Government away with tariff protection, industry spokesmen have taken surprisingly firm stand against international cartel arrange- ments which has led somewhat more hesitant stand against domestic monopolies. American business feels sufficiently virile alone the PREWAR PRODUCT PEAKS AND ESTIMATED STEEL CONSUMPTION Estimated Total Steel Steel Consumption PRODUCT for Shapes Peak Production per Unit Peak Year, and Year Units Produced Net Tons Piling 4,587,400 1.7 7,800,000 40,000 Freight cars............... 1923 17.5 3,118,000 Passenger 1926 2,900 133, 834,000 Locomotives............... 1923 4,400 200 880,000 frogs and switches..... 162,000 Mechanical 1941 3,900,000 225 Washing machines......... 1941 electric and 122,000 gas 130 1941 2,300,000 gas and 728,000 electric 200 construction.......... 1929 Includes residential construction. 8,643,000 2,939,000 1926, peak year, 729,000 single and two-family homes built, taking estimated 1,575,000 tons including heating systems. global markets without the restric- tions output, territory price characteristic cartels. Contrari- wise, England and Germany has been industrialists who first became beguiled the debilitating stabilities cartelization. the one hand, therefore, cer- tain divisions the Government are prosecuting American businesses for numerous prewar cartel commit- ments, whereas other government policy-makers are preaching the merits postwar cartels under Fed- eral sponsorship. The same split per- sonality exists regarding monopolies, with the government prosecuting such arrangements while encouraging their growth, and with business groups also distributed both sides the fence. regards metals technology 1944, little happened real signif- icance, and seems unlikely that 1945 will witness anything basic in- fluence. the steel industry there great deal attention paid the likelihood electric furnace over- capacity resulting the softening prices electric furnace steels the level open-hearth competitive prod- ucts. Larger electric furnace units, using decarburized blown hot metal has brought unit productive capacity within the general competitive area open hearths. Counterbalancing this the war-demonstrated ability the basic open hearth meet electric fur- nace quality standards, means basket pouring with related higher working and pouring temperatures, refined pit and mold practice, and process control ranging through the soaking pit. Just soon war demands ease Estimated Product Requirements, Net Tons | Bars (Including All Reinforcing) Other 2,308,000 932,000 30,000 9,000 19,000 777,000 34,000 64,000 11,000 216,000 1,156,000 1,815,000 1,037,000 a re Data: THE AGE, and other sources. 52—THE IRON AGE, January 1945 purchases represent about per cent family expenditures once income raised $3000, there- abouts. family income distribution follows the neat pattern laid down prog- nosticators, durable goods industries will enjoy greater participation postwar markets. Per cent quite possible that electric furnace-open hearth battle attri- tion will develop, but the surprising thing that all observers who solve the problem excess electric furnace capacity this manner fail recog- nize that the competitive knife has two cutting edges. When the pressure for outlets reaches the point that elec- tric furnace producers seek produc- tion means price cutting there nothing prevent the open hearth interests from dropping their prices maintain advantageous price gap. The economics the two opera- tions are such that all-out strug- gle for dominance the open-hearth can likely far better stand the price pace. However, since many steel mills have both types capacity and since this situation would quickly obvi- ously debilitating, unlikely that the future role electric furnace steels will nearly belligerent observers prophesy. fair amount proprietary re- search being expended low- alloy high-tensile steels, and the re- surgence interest has undoubtedly peace-time competitive threat high- tensile, high-yield, wrought aluminum alloys with hot harden- ing characteristics the Alcoa (type 75S) and Reynolds (type R301) anal- yses. These even better aluminum alloys will threaten worthwhile vol- ume steel tonnage. The steel de- velopments have progressed such point that they offset some degree the potential inroads aluminum and magnesium alloys. the field highly alloyed steels for high temperature service tre- Durable Goods Per cent Average Dollars mendous amount current research being concentrated. Such develop- ments have definite postwar objectives. Rocket ordnance, jet aircraft and gas turbines, and the like have surged from theoretical practical basis during the war, with consequent de- mands for alloy steels operate temperature ranges above 1700 deg. Any research leading the de- velopment steels with temperature life even few degrees higher than standard well worth the effort expended. There expectation that jet and gas turbine equipment will find wide application postwar aircraft, and gas turbine applications railroad and marine equipment are now considered certain. the general steel picture the “equivalency” many the war emergency steels will lead con- tinued trend buying the basis actual physical properties. The trend hardenability the main re- quirement steel will transferred bodily into postwar buying and pro- duction. The physical properties fully tempered martensite steel given carbon content are quite sim- ilar regardless the alloys used, ex- cept the field high alloy steels. Since hardenability what many con- sumers steel are after, the postwar period will likely see wider limits the specific chemistry certain steels. Since molybdenum particularly effi- cient contributing greatly hard- enability and does readily oxidize out steel, the increasing participation molybdenum-containing steels es- tablished prior the war will likely maintained the postwar period. Family Total Expenditures The so-called needled steels with boron constituent will undoubt- edly have role play, but since boron very fugitive element and since boron additions are not nearly inexpensive has been indicated the function this war-developed alloy the postwar period will definite but comparatively minor. Boron technology has, however, titi- lated the imagination steel metal- lurgists potency minute quan- tities alloying elements, sphere interest already plumbed their nonferrous compatriots. Any broadening the chemistry bands steels during the postwar period could well facilitate the absorp- tion the large volumes alloy scrap that are building here and will flood for years from dismantled war equipment, but here again the utilization such alloy scrap tied with competition pressures the postwar period. the search for husi- ness gets intense there will cer- tainly disinclination employ large quantities alloy scrap over which there not the fullest control residual elements. The catholic nature alloy scrap precludes close control hardenability the refining stage and could well result many off-heats for which home would have found divergencies from speci- fications which would not satisfac- tory particular consumers. The steel industry therefore may well ignore the large quantities available alloy scrap and prefer the utilization clean charges with spe- cific inoculations known quantities the various ferroalloys. THE IRON AGE, January 1945—53 Distribution Families Various Income Levels it. 25 iN 500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 5500 6000 armor plate for one the super-battleships. Shipbuilding 1944 was again the largest consumer steel, accounting for about one-fifth all finished steel. | Steel, 1944 After working itself into comfortable mid-year position, the steel industry again entering period schedule improvising, maintenance difficulties, delayed deliveries, mal flow steel orders with satisfactory product mix, the steel in- dustry the year closed was abrupt- faced with secondary war steel demand peak. This had all the ear marks bringing back schedule dif- ficulties, deferment some CMP or- ders and general push-back essential and regular civilian require- ments. the year ended and the steel industry produced more steel than apt equalled for some time 500,000 net tons), the tempo was one war steel first and everything else second. There little indication that “seconds” would get much atten- tion. Shell steel, Navy structural re- quirements and general war items were greater demand than any time since 1943. actual illustration, the change the battlefronts Europe resulted increase ammunition steel from about 300,000 tons month November 1944, extended pro- gram 560,000 tons month FTER having had small glimpse March 1945. Should the Germans not definitely put out the war that time, indications were that muni- tion steel needs would rise even higher levels. The impact shell steel needs, which when related total output are small, nevertheless, has effect upon the production such products semi-finished steel, rails and hot rolled bars. Most these items are made the same type mills which produce the semi-finished form the final shape requirements for shell Demands from the railroads were great for rails that every ef- fort was being made see that the nation’s carriers were supplied with the tonnage rails sudden shifts military requirements, and impending series labor demands. view the substantial cutback 1944 requirements. With the start the new year and depending entirely upon the course the European War, there was little chance that civilian requirements, matter whether they were essential non-essential, would fulfilled any greater amount than they were the past several months. Even though manufacturers had substantial and logical plans for their postwar activi- ty, the failure the most optimistic views for early ending the Euro- pean War materialize had satisfac- torily shelved excessive conversation and action postwar requirements. Until Germany definitely crushed, civilian users were reconciled the advancement war require- ments even lieu essential civilian production. Early 1944 the steel industry had comparatively easy sailing. War con- tracts were heavy; products were prof- itable many cases, and generally there was question “going out and getting the business.” Net sales returns, despite huge sales hot roll- sheets, plates and structural steels were enhanced special war items. However, the middle the year many the latter passed out the picture. This situation had pro- found effect upon the so-called prod- uct mix, and hence the profit picture the steel industry. Most steel companies the middle 1944 had begun indicate sub- stantial decline net income due en- tirely the change the type products being produced for the war effort. Regardless this fact there was little from the industry the subject prices. matter fact the steel industry, through its OPA Advisory Committee March 1944, was cognizant the wage Tom Campbell problem and the anti-inflation stand the administration that withdrew its demand for higher steel prices certain products even though the OPA had expressed willingness make agreed-upon adjustments. However, with the recent WLB wage award and with the adverse change the production profitable items, became apparent the year ended that the steel industry would forced ask for price relief which did. Its base prices had been un- changed for several years. Despite the fact that the industry had gained certain advantages, such the charg- ing some extras, which normal times were “conveniently forgotten,” and despite the fact that the industry was allowed charge freight so- called dislocated areas (locations which during normal times were not generally serviced steel company), was apparent according reliable inform- ation that many steel companies were, from financial standpoint reaching the “end their rope.” Although con- siderable conversation along this line made its way into public print 1944, there were many reliable indications that now the “wolf was the door.” With large steel companies feeling the effect net financial reverses, small non-intergrated mills year opened were facing even more urgent problems. Many these small companies had fallen into the reluct- ant habit looking for relief from quarters other than themselves. Some the more enterprising companies, however, had and were still realizing that their salvation depended upon the aggressiveness with which they studied steel markets and the ardor with which they attacked this prob- The author conversant with some small companies which are sin- THE IRON AGE, January q 3 § @ 4 ron. Total output, per cent Ww Flatrolled Product Shipments Per Cent Total Steel Shipments 1939-1944 Total output, per cent cerely independent large steel com- pany trends. Those small steel companies which not want umbrella put over them have already planned their ac- tion for the postwar period. These concerns are completely uninterested and cold any plans which are pro- mulgated “to help the little fellows.” They have already sounded out their markets and they know precisely whom they will sell steel the post- war period and, furthermore, they not extend themselves into consump- tion lines which are unprofitable. other words they have looked the field over, they know where they fit and they are going after that type business. The question the small steel com- pany, especially view predict- ing discussing 1945 potentialities, brings mind the cloak room talk small companies which derive their raw materials from larger steel com- panies and then compete with the latter with the same finished products may forced out the postwar pe- riod. This has been general refrain for many years and the same tune will probably continue for many years come. The mortality grated mills the past few years such confidently predict that those which now exist will weather any storm either productwise price- wise 1945 and the postwar era. Fortunately for some small com- Pipe and Tubing Output Process, Per Cent Total Production 1939-1944 Electricweld 1939 1940 1941 56—THE IRON AGE, January 1945 1942 1943 1944* panies the active heads have been smart enough cash normal perhaps sub-normal mistakes judg- ment made the larger companies. For instance, some smaller steel com- panies knowing that the larger ones are primarily interested tonnage have gone out after specialized “hand made” steel orders. Thus these small companies have been able select their business, keeping mind the type product well the necessary freight absorption. Similar the larger companies the smaller units are means uni- form their opinion their salva- tion. Some want bask the lime- light general steel demand support- the crumbs which fall from the table the larger companies, while others have adopted the David and Goliath attitude. the basis past experience, those companies the latter category will recorded the American Iron Steel directory for many years come, for the sim- ple reason that they represent the backbone American endeavor—free enterprise, regardless. While the small companies are struggling with their problems, even the larger ones are having their head- aches. Early 1944, lucrative gov- ernment contracts were such that little worry was expended the balance sheet. Shell steel, armor plate and other special war items were suf- ficient carry the burden for such steel products semi-finished steel, plates, hot rolled sheets and rails. During the middle 1944, however, the more profitable war items were cut back with the result that the net realized for steel products drop- ped substantially. was this factor, probably more than any other, which caused steel companies become strongly active recently seeking price relief from the Office Price Administration. Common both large and small steel companies, also, has been the substantial increase the average wage rates paid. This somewhat different from the so-called basic wage rate. The so-called basic rate for common labor 78c. hr. How- ever, because the longer work-week and because overtime, steel com- panies were paying average hourly rate $1.18 per hr. This sharp contrast average around 68c. hr. 1936, and 84c. hr. 1938, the latter incidentally represented the year taken freezing point for steel prices. Most steel executives realize that their biggest customer the past few years has been the gov- ernment, but they are also haunted the fact that when the war over, they and mark that high knov whil sale stee sure 5 A 0 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944* out in pac 194 BR they will have high basic wage rates and highly competitive steel sales market. Realistic steel people freely admit that they are between their custom- ers and the strong steel union. The customers want the lowest price pos- sible, while the steel union wants the highest wage possible. Even the fore- most industrial relations managers know that the union here stay, while even the lesser lights, the sales organizations know that the steel customers will exert their pres- sure pricewise. The sum total this place the industry, for some time PERATING RATES: Steel output methods per cent ca- pacity for the years 1943 1944; data compiled THE IRON AGE. Steel output per cent capacity come, squarely behind the eight ball. There particular reason believe that steel executives cannot satisfy both the customer and the em- ployees and still support the conten- tion that steel production the coun- try’s No. endeavor. Unsung and generally nized are the steel production men who, after all, must make good the promises the steel industry their customers, regardless price wage costs. These men have done superb job 1944, just they had done 1942 and 1943. Despite the need for furnace repairs and the lack man- power, steel production for 1944 was approximately 89,500,000 net tons. top this achievement there were very few cases the past year when steel for the Armed Forces was not forthcoming when required the military. The sweat, toil and accumu- lation practical experience which made this achievement possible can probably never told words figures. something which practi- cal steel men will use bogey shoot future years. Estimated finished steel production for 1944 was about 63,846,000 tons. The distribution consuming indus- tries changed but little from 1943. The general pattern distribution shown Table should in- terpreted the knowledge that war production included practically every consuming industry. Especially this true the miscellaneous cate- gory where for security reasons many ordnance and other war products have been included. obvious that more complete analysis, were pos- sible, would show general pattern for 1944 somewhat similar, per- centage basis 1939, the only differ- ence being the substantial increase the actual tonnage steel produced. Shipbuilding 1944 continued take the largest portion steel ship- ments exclusive miscellaneous ton- nage, just did 1943. Estimates show that 1944 shipbuilding alone consumed close per cent total steel shipments compared per cent This relatively insignifi- cant decline was due largely the dissipation Maritime inventories during the latter half 1943. other words the amount steel that went into shipbuilding 1944 and 1943 was substantially the same for each year. The increase the amount steel going into agriculture 1944 was primarily due belated recognition that without farm implements, the na- tion’s food supply would suffer. Prob- ably more than any other essential ci- vilian endeavor, steel for agricultural needs was, the middle 1944, ade-. quately supplied. Only manpower shortage the closing months the year prevented the farm implement industry from stepping production desired levels. The consumption figure for the auto- motive and aircraft industries was more less affected the inclusion war items and such little value for use postwar estimate. estimated that these two groups consumed 1944 total close million tons steel 7.4 per cent total steel shipments. This far cry from 1939 when the auto- motive industry consumed per cent total steel shipments. There reason believe that when the war THE IRON AGE, January 1945—57 | ] 105 Hearth ° ° ° 90 V4 e ~ 1943 1944 TABLE Production Product (1929, 1935-1944) (In Net Tons and Per Cent Total) Bars (Hot Rolled, Wire Plates Finished, Tool Pipe and and Wire (Universal Sheets Steel, Carbon Tubes, Skelp Products, and Sheared) and Strip Shapes and Alloy) and Billets Wire Rods 1929 5,624,798 12.2 8,688,726 18.8 5,351,382 11.6 8,314,316 18.1 11.9 7.6 1935 1,629,987 6.1 32.6 17.8 2,582,104 10.2 1936 2,829,950 7.5 11,447,319 30.2 3,245,346 8.6 6,822,492 18.0 4,225,272 11.2 3,357,626 8.9 1937 3,632,438 8.8 12,023,275 29.2 3,670,068 6,755,012 16.4 4,705,954 11.4 3,370,405 1938 1,919,835 8.1 6,948,749 29.6 8.8 14.8 2,882,471 12.2 2,361,630 10.0 1939 3,101,981 7.9 11, 30.4 3,358,985 8.6 15.7 4,348,630 9.4 1940 4,323,4 8.9 13,783,700 8.7 16.4 5,029,966 10.6 4,351,848 9.1 1941 6,199,575 9.9 16,142,759 25.9 5,724,836 9.2 10,978,698 17.6 6,583,495 10.6 1942 18.8 11,248,392 9.6 11,939,982 19.2 9.5 4,632,017 20.2 10,899,000 17.0 12,005, 18.7 5,861,000 9.1 4,385,000 6.8 1944 12,258,903 19.2 6.2 11,108,920 17.4 6,293,709 9.9 NOTE: Data for 1929, 1935-1943 from 1944 figures are estimated the author. over, the automotive industry will not return its prominent position among the heaviest consumers steel products. This especially true be- cause the million car year goal when, and material and man- power are available. that consensus automotive of- ficials Detroit indicates that prac- tically cars will off the assembly lines for least four months after V-E Day. the end eight months, estimated that the industry will turning out cars the rate million year and will not reach the 6-million-car-a-year rate until months after Germany defeated. Graphically this would mean zero number cars months after V-E Day, average rate per cent the bogey the second four months, and aver- age rate per cent the bogey the last four months, aver- age per cent the million- car-a-year goal for the first year after Germany crushed. Steel makers, despite their current preoccupation with the production war steel, have their eyes Detroit. This understandable when real- ized that the total sheet output 1944-was not changed much from 1939 output despite the fact that total steel production Even more striking the fact that 1939 sheet output represented more than per cent total steel ship- ments, compared with per cent second and third postwar years sheet production will climb its past prom- inence. The sheet picture when minutely examined discloses one the major reasons why the steel industry has become cost conscious. 1939 58—THE IRON AGE, January 1945 the first 1944 the relationship between hot roll- sheets and cold rolled sheets was changed but little. However, total production cold rolled sheets 1944 was almost identical prewar years despite the overall increase finished steel output. Since relative- good return obtained way extras cold rolled items, obvi- ous that the profit column suffered this static characteristic cold rolled sheet and strip output. Due deterior